Liao Xiaoye

Xiaoye Liao is a male microeconomic theorist with expertise in information economics, game theory, and political economy. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from New York University in 2018, after completing an M.A. in Economics from Fudan University and a B.A. in Management from East China University of Science and Technology. From 2018 to 2021, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at NYU Shanghai. His research focuses on dynamic models of persuasion, coordination, and policy formation. He has taught microeconomics, macroeconomics, and game theory across various institutions and is a recipient of several academic fellowships, including the Henry MacCracken Fellowship at NYU.

Bayesian Persuasion with Optimal Learning, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 97, Dec 2021.

A continuous-time Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver acquires sequential signals from a designer's experiment. The paper characterizes optimal disclosure strategies under skepticism.